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Boosting health insurance coverage in developing countries: Do conditional cash 
transfer programmes matter in Mexico?  
Abstract 
Background: Achieving universal health insurance coverage is a goal for many middle-
income countries. Even when universal health insurance programmes are in place, there are 
significant barriers to reaching the lowest socio-economic groups such as a lack of awareness 
of the programmes or knowledge of the benefits to participating in the insurance market. 
Conditional cash transfer programmes (CCT) can encourage participation through mandatory 
health education classes, increased contact with the health care system, and cash payments to 
reduce costs of participating in the insurance market.  
Objective: To explore if participation in a CCT programme in Mexico, Oportunidades, is 
significantly associated with self-reported enrolment in a public health insurance programme.  
Methods: Cross-sectional data from 2007 collected on 29595 Mexican households where the 
household head is aged between ages 15-60 was analysed. A logit model was used to estimate 
the association between Oportunidades participation and awareness of enrolment in a public 
health insurance programme.  
Results: Participation in the Oportunidades programme is associated with a 25% higher 
likelihood of being actively aware of enrolment in Seguro Popular, a public health insurance 
scheme for the lowest socio-economic groups.  
Conclusions: Participation in the Oportunidades CCT programme is positively associated 
with awareness of enrolment in public health insurance. CCT programmes may be used to 
promote participation of the lowest socio-economic groups in universal public health 
insurance systems. This is crucial to achieving universal health insurance coverage in middle-
income countries. 
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Introduction 
Good health is necessary for sustainable economic development. Three out of the eight 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by 189 countries in the UN Millennium 
Declaration in 2000 are health related. Improving general health has become a priority for 
governments of many developing economies, partly to meet the MDG targets established for 
2015. Recent developments in the social policy of major middle-income economies such as 
Brazil, Mexico, India, China and South Africa increasingly focus on universal health 
coverage as a means for social and economic development (United Nations, 2012). Access to 
health insurance has been identified as essential for promoting good health (World Health 
Organisation, 2013) and it is probable that universal health insurance will play an important 
role in the post-2015 agenda. Insurance improves health by eliminating barriers to accessing 
adequate health care and protects people from unexpected expenditure and impoverishment 
(Bärnighausen et al., 2007; Gumber and Kulkarni, 2000).  
To improve their coverage, public health insurance schemes in middle-income economies 
have expanded their reach to target informal and rural workers, who had been previously 
excluded from participation in these programmes. By tackling these restrictions in the supply 
of public health insurance, middle-income countries such as China, Mexico, Philippines, and 
Vietnam, have aimed to protect the most deprived groups of the population from the financial 
risks associated with using health services (Wagstaff et al., 2009).  
From the perspective of improving access to health insurance, efforts have focused on 
creating insurance programmes and products that remove the barriers that prevented access 
by the lowest socio-economic groups to these programmes, as well as improving the quality 
of the services on offer. However, enrolling the rural population remains one of the main 
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challenges for achieving universal coverage in developing economies (Nguyen and Knowles, 
2010). This suggests that there are also demand side failures affecting the achievement of 
universal health insurance coverage. The concept of health insurance is frequently not well 
understood, especially among the vulnerable and poor who are often illiterate and/or have 
very low education levels (Knowles, 2005). This acts as a barrier to insurance uptake; even 
where insurance is free but individuals need to enrol in the programme. Evidence suggests 
that in a developing country setting, formal education and better understanding of the product 
have positive effects on take-up (Acharya et al., 2012).  
Demand side factors such as product awareness and health knowledge, as well as supply side 
factors, are thus likely to be important determinants of health insurance demand at the 
household level. 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes offer a two pronged approach to combating 
poverty by improving family liquidity and building up human capital (Doetinchem et al., 
2008). We hypothesize that CCT programmes could be used to address the demand side 
failures of public health insurance uptake amongst the lowest socio-economic groups of the 
population. CCTs give cash payments to individuals in exchange for complying with specific 
positive activities such as vaccinating children, health education classes, and attending 
preventive health care services. The mandatory health education classes and exposure to the 
health system by compulsory preventive health checks influence human capital formation and 
health behaviour (Gertler and Van der Gaag, 1990).   
CCT programmes have been widely adopted in Latin America and are now spreading to Asia 
and Africa. Research on CCTs is extensive but it has mostly focused on evaluating their 
impact on outcomes that are directly associated with the conditions imposed by the 
programmes such as health care service use, health, nutrition, and schooling (Rawlings and 
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Rubio, 2005). CCTs have been found to be an effective tool for modifying and improving 
short-term health behaviour (Lagarde et al., 2009).  
The aim of this paper is to explore if CCT participation is significantly associated with self-
reported enrolment in the public insurance market. We exploit health policies adopted by the 
Mexican government, which implemented a universal health insurance system, Seguro 
Popular, in 2004 and had been implementing the CCT programme Oportunidades, formerly 
Progresa, since 1998.    
The association between CCT programmes and awareness of enrolment in health insurance 
programmes by the lowest socio-economic groups could be essential to accelerating the 
achievement of universal coverage in developing economies. Countries in similar 
circumstances could address some of the demand side failures related to the uptake of 
universal health insurance through CCTs.      
Methods 
The Programmes 
In 2000, there were serious supply side failures in the health care market in Mexico.  
Approximately half of the Mexican population lacked access to any public health insurance 
scheme. Informal workers had to attend low-cost public facilities funded by the Department 
of Health or pay for private health care services. Out-of-pocket health expenditure 
represented more than half of the total national health expenditure. The nature of the system 
triggered important debates on fairness and efficiency issues such as the unequal distribution 
in the allocation of public resources per capita between the insured and uninsured (González-
Pier et al., 2007).  
 
 
5 
 
To address the failing in the health care system of limited access to health insurance for the 
majority of the population and high household expenditures on health care, a public health 
insurance system, Seguro Popular, was implemented in 2004. Seguro Popular targets the 
poorest groups of the population who lack access to any other public health insurance 
scheme. To participate in this programme beneficiaries pay contributions according to their 
decile of income but families in the bottom deciles receive free coverage. Seguro Popular 
was rolled out gradually, being widely available by 2006 (García-Díaz and Sosa-Rubí, 2011). 
Ninety eight per cent of the families enrolled in the insurance programme received free 
coverage as they were in the lowest income decile (Sosa-Rubí et al., 2009). This reveals that 
Seguro Popular is effectively reaching its target, i.e. poorest and uninsured groups of the 
population. Households eligible for alternative higher-quality public schemes for formal 
workers are not legally entitled to participate in Seguro Popular. Appendix A provides more 
information on the public insurance system in Mexico.   
We speculate that demand side factors related to health insurance product awareness and 
knowledge of the health care system could be addressed by a CCT programme, providing one 
is in place. Oportunidades is a CCT programme that started in rural Mexico in 1998 with the 
aim of ‘breaking the intergenerational circle of poverty’ by improving the educational, health 
and nutritional status of the low income population. 
Oportunidades currently provides services to approximately 25 million Mexicans (5.8 million 
families), roughly a quarter of the country’s population. The programme operates in the 32 
Mexican States, with a budget in 2011 of over 5 million USD1.  
Participation in Oportunidades is restricted to families in the poorest groups of the population 
that satisfy a number of geographic and socio-economic criteria. Oportunidades provides 
                                                          
1 More information on the programme can be found on www.oportunidades.gob.mx  
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regular payments to female household heads2 in the form of cash or electronic transfers into 
their bank account. The payments are contingent upon regular school attendance of children, 
regular medical check-ups for family members and preventive health workshops (platicas).  
The health component of Oportunidades targets women/mothers aged between 20 and 59. A 
mandatory requirement for receiving the cash payments is that women attend fortnightly 
workshops on preventive health methods and best health practices for the home. A key 
objective of these educational sessions is encouraging beneficiary women to be proactive in 
obtaining their right to social services (Adato et al., 2000). Working age women are also 
required to attend preventive treatment sessions for tuberculosis, diabetes, cancer, AIDS, etc. 
as well as receiving treatment for addictions, when needed. To access these health care 
services, beneficiaries are entitled to receive a health insurance package with limited 
coverage called IMSS-Oportunidades. This insurance package only covers the costs 
associated with the mandatory health components of the CCT programme. Regular contact 
with the health services from attending these appointments may increase awareness of 
entitlement to receive full health insurance coverage through Seguro Popular, and, more 
generally, increase knowledge about the health care system (Sosa-Rubí et al., 2011). 
Insurance Choice 
This is an exploratory study to investigate the association between CCTs with training 
programmes and social support, and knowledge of being enrolled in a public health insurance 
scheme. There are three main reasons why the two may be associated. Firstly, CCTs can act 
as information brokers. Mandatory health classes provide a platform to spread health 
information that participants would otherwise not easily access. CCTs have been found to 
indirectly impact beneficiaries’ reproductive health behaviour and decisions through a 
                                                          
2 Couples are comprised of a male and female household head. The female household head receives the 
conditional cash transfer payment. 
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‘learning effect’ (Sosa-Rubí et al., 2011) and to encourage beneficiaries to be informed and 
active health consumers (Barber and Gertler, 2009). More information means that 
participants can make better informed choices about their health. If a lack of information is 
affecting uptake of public insurance by the lowest socio-economic groups, better access to 
health information will result in a higher likelihood of enrolling in a public health insurance 
scheme by participants.  
Secondly, Oportunidades participants are required to attend preventive health checks at 
public health clinics. Thus, they also have regular exposure to the public health system which 
may influence their perception on the value of public health insurance (Sosa-Rubí et al., 
2011). 
Finally, the cash payments from the CCT programme will increase household budgets. If 
costs associated with the public insurance programme such as the travel and time costs of 
enrolment are affecting uptake, the cash transfers may lower the perceived cost of 
participating in the public insurance market.   
Because of the nature of our data, we cannot identify which of these three pathways explains 
the association between knowledge of health insurance enrolment and participation in a CCT 
with a training programme and social support. 
Standard factors influencing insurance uptake will also be considered in the analysis models. 
The insurance decision is likely to be influenced by previous medical utilisation and 
expenditure. Health related behaviour such as tobacco expenditure may also influence the 
decision to invest in health insurance. Demographic and socio-economic factors such as age, 
literacy, ethnicity, car ownership, home ownership, household deprivation, and state of 
residence may equally influence the likelihood of choosing insurance (Sosa-Rubí et al., 
2009).  
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Data and Variables  
Oportunidades was originally designed as a randomized control trial. Data was collected by 
the Mexican Secretary for Social Development (SEDESOL). In 1998, access to the 
programme was randomly assigned among the rural localities in seven Mexican states.3 By 
2003, all targeted villages had been incorporated into the programme and an additional 
control group of rural localities was included in the analysis. In 2007, the two Mexican states 
with higher deprivation levels, Chiapas and Oaxaca, were added to the sample. In both cases, 
quasi-experimental propensity score matching techniques were used to sample localities 
receiving Oportunidades and localities not receiving the programme that shared similar 
observable characteristics such as distance to health centres, hospitals, primary and secondary 
schools, literacy levels, education, and deprivation levels. Thirty-eight socio-economic and 
demographic variables were considered in the propensity score to match the treatment and 
control localities. This ensured that the localities with and without access to the 
Oportunidades programme were similar and comparable. The percentage of the local 
population covered by Seguro Popular was also used in the propensity score (INSP, 2007) 
and all the localities in the sample had access to Seguro Popular at the time of the survey.4  
To enable comparison across groups of participant and non-participant households, 
SEDESOL collected information which is used to create a household poverty index 
controlling for the demographic and socio-economic conditions that determine eligibility to 
participate in Oportunidades (Todd, 2004). According to this index, all households in the 
estimation sample are entitled to receive Oportunidades. However, even if households are 
eligible to participate in Oportunidades they may not be able to participate if the programme 
is not available in their local area. This allows us to investigate if participating in 
                                                          
3 Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Puebla, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, and Veracruz. 
4 Information on the construction of the index and the selection of localities can be found in Instituto Nacional 
de Salud Pública (2006).  
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Oportunidades is associated with knowledge of Seguro Popular participation by comparing 
households who share similar characteristics but some are unable to access Oportunidades 
because it is not yet offered in their area. Ninety per cent of eligible households in rural 
localities when given access to the CCT programme in 2000, enrolled in it (Fernald et al., 
2008). 
The cross-sectional analysis uses data collected in 2007. We do not take full advantage of the 
randomized control element of the sample design in our analysis because we are not trying to 
determine causal pathways that may explain the association between participation in 
Oportunidades and enrolment in a health insurance programme. This is an exploratory study 
to determine if there is an association between knowledge of enrolment in a health insurance 
scheme and participation in Oportunidades.   
Data from 2007 is used because the universal insurance programme, Seguro Popular, was 
introduced in 2004 after the previous round of Oportunidades’ evaluation data was collected 
in 2003. This is also the only wave of data collected on the two states with the highest 
deprivation levels in the country. Our sample is limited to households where the household 
head is of working age (15-60). Different health insurance and social protection programmes 
are available after retirement which is why we decided to focus on a working age population. 
A similar age group is used in the analysis by Knaul et al. (2011). Our study is at the 
household level, but it is assumed that it is women’s influence on household decision making 
that affects health insurance consumption (Barber and Gertler, 2009). This assumption is a 
consequence of participation in Oportunidades being restricted to adult females.  
A short and a long version of the questionnaire were used to collect the ENCEL-
Oportunidades dataset. In our analysis we exploit the long version of the questionnaire 
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because it includes questions on ethnicity and literacy of the household head, as well as on 
health behaviour and expenditure. Our sample contains 29595 observations. 
Outcome Variable 
The regression analysis focuses on the decision to participate in the public insurance system 
measured by awareness of enrolment in the Seguro Popular insurance programme. In the 
analysis it is a dichotomous outcome variable that takes the value of one if the household has 
knowledge of their enrolment in the insurance programme and is equal to zero if a household 
reported not being affiliated to Seguro Popular. We use this variable to measure perceptions 
regarding enrolment. Respondents must be aware that they are enrolled in the programme. If 
they are automatically enrolled in Seguro Popular, but are not aware of this enrolment when 
responding to the health questionnaire, we assume they will report not being enrolled in this 
health insurance scheme.  
It is important to note that when Seguro Popular was introduced, Oportunidades participants 
were enrolled automatically. However, participants may not have been aware of their 
enrolment status and potential benefits of the insurance programme (García-Díaz and Sosa-
Rubí, 2011).  
This insurance scheme extends to the partner or spouse of the affiliate, children under 18 or 
up to 25 if single and a student or economically dependent and living in the same household 
as their parent(s). It covers relatives over 64 and every disabled member of the family 
(Aterido et al., 2011). For this reason, this analysis is conducted at the household level.  
After dropping observations with incomplete or missing responses on insurance affiliation 
(less than 1% of the sample), we included in our analysis households who report being 
affiliated to Seguro Popular and exclude from the insured group households with alternative 
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forms of insurance such as Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS) and Instituto de 
Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado (ISSSTE) (see Appendix A 
for more information on the different insurance programmes). There are no restrictions 
placed on the non-insured group included in the analysis.   
Explanatory Variables 
The main explanatory variable of interest is a dichotomous indicator for Oportunidades 
participation which equals one if the individual is a participant and zero if she is not a 
participant. The non-participant group lives in an area where Oportunidades is not yet 
available but shares similar socio-economic and demographic characteristics with those who 
are Oportunidades participants. We also control for the age, literacy, and ethnicity of the 
household heads, as well as home ownership, car ownership, and an indicator for the 
deprivation level of the household based on CONEVAL (2009). Weekly household 
expenditure on tobacco, monthly household expenditure on medication, number of days that 
household heads had been ill during the month prior to the survey, and past utilisation of 
health care services are also included as explanatory variables in the analysis.  
For the majority of our explanatory variables, there is missing or incomplete responses for 
less than 5% of the observations.  However, the expenditure variables: medical and tobacco 
expenditure have missing or incomplete responses of approximately 30%.  We run additional 
regression models that exclude these expenditure variables.  The results are not significantly 
different from models including these expenditure variables. The pattern of missing data does 
not seem to be systematically related to participation in Seguro Popular or in Oportunidades. 
Analysis  
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First, we described the variables included in the analysis. This initial description was not 
adjusted for any variable. It simply shows the mean number of sample members for each 
variable.5    
The main analysis focuses on the factors affecting participation in the public insurance 
scheme, Seguro Popular. It is estimated using a logistic model. The dependent variable is a 
dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent reports being enrolled in the public 
insurance scheme ( 1hM ) and is equal to zero otherwise ( 0hM ). The logistic regression 
model is defined as follows:  
)1(
0
1 1
*


 
 
otherwise
eOSPZMif
M hhhhthhh

 
The subscript h denotes households. hZ is a vector of socio-economic characteristics. hP  
is a 
vector capturing past health related expenditure. hS is a vector of state dummies, hO  is a 
scalar containing the dummy variable for Oportunidades participation, and he is a random 
error term. The coefficients of parameters to be estimated for the vectors are  ,, and for 
the scalar is  .   
Equation (1) is estimated by maximum likelihood. Results are supplemented by estimating 
the average marginal effects (AMEs) using the STATA v.12 post estimation command, 
margin. AMEs have a straightforward quantitative interpretation compared with the 
coefficients which only have a qualitative interpretation. The AMEs are estimated by 
calculating individual marginal effects for the explanatory variables included in the analysis 
                                                          
5 We do not control for the selection bias of benefiting from Oportunidades as the incorporation of households 
in the programme is based on observable locality and household socio-economic characteristics. According to 
the poverty index, all the households considered in our sample are eligible to participate in the programme. 
Also, enrolment is supply-driven and the percentage of eligible households that choose not to participate is very 
low (García-Díaz and Sosa-Rubí, 2011).    
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and averaging these calculations over the sample. For dichotomous variables, the AMEs are 
calculated by predicting the probability that the indicator variable in question is equal to one 
and the probability that the variable is equal to zero. The difference between these two 
probabilities is then averaged across the whole sample. For continuous variables, the AMEs 
are estimated by taking the derivative of the predicted probability of the variable in question 
and averaging across the whole sample.   
Results 
Table 1 compares the socio-economic, demographic, and health characteristics between 
participants and non-participants. Approximately 34% of the sample participates in Seguro 
Popular and 54% of our sample are Oportunidades beneficiaries. According to our 
deprivation indicator, 84% of the sample is classified as deprived. 
Table 2 reports the average marginal effect estimates for the factors influencing public 
insurance participation. Participants in Oportunidades are 25% more likely to report being 
enrolled in Seguro Popular, the public health insurance scheme. Households that report being 
enrolled in Seguro Popular insurance compared to not being enrolled in the insurance 
programme are more likely to have a household head that is literate, be a member of an ethnic 
minority, be deprived according to the deprivation index and have used medical care during 
the past year. Households that own their car are significantly less likely to report being 
enrolled in Seguro Popular insurance scheme.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Achieving universal health insurance coverage in developing countries is essential to 
promoting good health. Enrolling the lowest socio-economic groups has proven difficult. We 
hypothesize that low uptake of public insurance by the most deprived socio-economic group 
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stems from a lack of information and awareness about the insurance market which leads 
individuals to make sub-optimal choices.   
We suggest that the CCT programme Oportunidades can conceivably be used to address 
demand side failures in the health insurance market. This may be because the programme acts 
as a knowledge broker, plausibly through the mandatory health education classes and social 
support, and increases exposure to the public health system helping participants make more 
informed choices. Additionally, the cash payments from CCT programmes alter households’ 
budget changing the perceived costs and benefits of insurance and affecting uptake. This line 
of reasoning is coherent with findings from quantitative and qualitative studies that report 
positive behavioural changes of Oportunidades participants related to health and health care 
(Barber and Gertler, 2009).     
We find that participation in a CCT programme is positively associated with being enrolled in 
a health insurance system. These results suggest that developing countries should address 
both demand and supply side failures that affect uptake of voluntary and universal public 
health insurance. This is an exploratory study and we cannot identify causal pathways that 
may affect this association between CCT participation and enrolment in a health insurance 
programme.   
The present study has several limitations. To focus on Mexican policy that addressed supply 
side failures related to the uptake of public insurance we are limited to one year of data that 
was collected after the Seguro Popular programme was implemented. Using cross-sectional 
data limits our ability to infer causality. However, the association between CCT programmes 
and health insurance participation had, to our knowledge, never been assessed before and is 
crucial in aiding understanding on how to achieve the universal coverage objective. 
Additionally, this study is limited to participation in the Seguro Popular insurance scheme. 
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Alternative social-security public insurance forms that are compulsory in nature such as 
IMSS or ISSSTE have not been considered in the analysis. We assume that workers entitled 
to these schemes always participate, even if in practice private employers frequently would 
not pay their health insurance contribution excluding the more vulnerable employees (Aterido 
et al., 2011). 
Equally, evidence exists that households benefiting from Oportunidades might have been 
automatically affiliated to the Seguro Popular programme; however, beneficiaries have not 
been informed and are frequently not aware of their status (García-Díaz and Sosa-Rubí, 
2011). In this study, data are self-reported and Oportunidades’ participants who are not aware 
of their health insurance affiliation report themselves as not being affiliated to any insurance 
scheme. Participation in Seguro Popular is used to measure perceptions regarding insurance 
coverage, in other words knowledge and/or awareness of programme participation and not 
actual formal enrolment. This supports the idea that CCTs might act as a knowledge broker. 
Even if in some countries automatic affiliation of cash transfer beneficiaries to universal 
insurance schemes is common practice, supply side policies are not enough. This research 
provides evidence of a potential need for demand side policies that increase active and 
informed participation in health decisions.  
The findings suggest that reducing demand side failures is important for improving access to 
health care for the lowest socio-economic groups. Middle-income countries with CCT 
programmes in place, such as Colombia or the Philippines, may have a higher likelihood of 
achieving universal health insurance coverage amongst the poorest compared to countries 
that do not address these demand side failures such as China. By encouraging informed 
decisions, CCTs might not only be used as a vehicle of accelerating free health insurance 
uptake, but also incentivize the use of private insurance. However, the nascent private health 
insurance market in Mexico and the small take-up by sample members in the data set of 
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private insurance impeded considering private insurance choice in the analysis. This paper 
builds a case for tailored health insurance policy accounting for the different poverty 
alleviation programmes that might be in place in each developing country. 
 
References 
Acharya A, Vellakkal S, Taylor F, Masset E, Satija A, Burke M, Ebrahim S. 2012. Impact of 
national health insurance for the poor and the informal sector in low and middle-income 
countries: a systematic review. EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of 
Education, University of London: London 
Adato M, de la Briere B, Mindek D, Quisumbing A. 2000. The impact of PROGRESA on 
women’s status and intrahousehold relations. Washington, DC: International Food Policy 
Research Institute. 
Aterido R, Hallward-Driemeier M, Pages C. 2011. Does expanding health insurance beyond 
formal-sector workers encourage informality? Measuring the impact of Mexico's Seguro 
Popular. The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series 2011: 5785. 
Barber S, Gertler P. 2009. Empowering women to obtain high quality care: evidence from an 
evaluation of Mexico’s conditional cash transfer programme. Health Policy and Planning 24 
(1): 18-25. 
Bärnighausen T, Liu Y, Zhang X, Sauerborn R. 2007. Willingness to pay for social health 
insurance among informal sector workers in Wuhan, China: a contingent valuation study. 
BMC Health Services Research 7: 114.  
CONEVAL. 2009. Metodología para la medición multidimensional de la pobreza en México. 
Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social. CONEVAL: Mexico DF. 
 
 
17 
 
Doetinchem O, Xu K, Carrin G. 2008. Conditional cash transfers: What’s in it for health? 
Technical Briefing Papers, 1. World Health Organisation: Geneva, Switzerland. 
Exchange rate averages. http://www.x-rates.com/average/?from=MXN&to=USD&amount 
=1&year=2007. [28 September 2012] 
Fernald, L., Gertler, P., Neufeld L.M. 2008. Role of cash in conditional cash transfer 
programmes for child health, growth, and development: an analysis of Mexico's 
Oportunidades. The Lancet 371(9615): 828 – 837. 
García-Díaz R, Sosa-Rubí S. 2011. Analysis of the distributional impact of out-of-pocket 
health payments: Evidence from a public health insurance program for the poor in Mexico. 
Journal of Health Economics 30: 707-718.  
Gertler P, Van der Gaag J. 1990. The willingness to pay for medical care: Evidence from two 
developing countries. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
González-Pier E, Gutiérrez-Delgado C. et al. 2007. Definición de prioridades para las 
intervenciones de salud en el Sistema de Protección Social en Salud de México. Salud 
Pública de México 49(1): 37-52.  
Gumber A, Kulkarni V. 2000. Health Insurance for informal sector: Case study of Gujarat. 
Economic and Political Weekly 35(40): 3607-3613.  
Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública (INSP). 2006. Nota metodológica general rural. 
Coordinación Nacional de Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades, SEDESOL: 
Mexico DF. In http://evaluacion.oportunidades.gob.mx [28 January 2013] 
 
 
18 
 
Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública (INSP). 2007. Nota técnica sobre el diseño muestral para 
la Encuesta de Evaluación Rural (ENCEL) 2007. SEDESOL: Mexico DF. In 
http://evaluacion.oportunidades.gob.mx [28 January 2013] 
Knaul FM, Wong R, Arreola-Ornelas H, Méndez O, Bitran R, Campino AC, Flórez-Nieto C, 
Giedion U, Maceira,D, Rathe M. 2011. Gastos catastróficos en salud de los hogares: Un 
análisis comparativo de doce países en América Latina y el Caribe. Salud Pública de México 
53: s85–s95. 
Knowles, J. C. 2007. Some key health insurance policy issues in Vietnam. Working 
Document for the Joint Health Policy Initiative. Hanoi. March. 
Lagarde M, Haines A, Palmer N. 2009. The impact of conditional cash transfers on health 
outcomes and use of health services in low and middle income countries. Cochrane Database 
of Systematic Reviews 4. Art. No.: CD008137. DOI: 10.1002/14651858.CD008137. 
Nguyen H, Knowles J. 2010. Demand for voluntary health insurance in developing countries: 
The case of Vietnam’s school-age children and adolescent student health insurance program. 
Social Science & Medicine 71: 2074-2082.  
Rawlings L, Rubio G. 2005. Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs. 
The World Bank Research Observer 20 (1):29-55.   
Sosa-Rubí S, Galárraga O, Harris J.E. 2009. Heterogeneous impact of the Seguro Popular 
program on the utilization of obstetrical services in Mexico, 2001–2006: A multinomial 
probit model with a discrete endogenous variable. Journal of Health Economics 28(1): 20-34.  
Sosa-Rubí S, Walker D, Servan E, Bautista-Arredondo S. 2011. Learning effect of a 
conditional cash transfer programme on poor rural women’s selection of delivery care in 
Mexico. Health Policy and Planning 26 (6):496-507. 
 
 
19 
 
Todd, P. 2004. Technical note on using matching estimators to evaluate the Oportunidades 
program for six year follow-up Evaluation of Oportunidades in rural areas. In 
http://evaluacion.oportunidades.gob.mx [28 January 2013] 
Wagstaff A, Lindelow M, Jun G, Ling X, Juncheng Q. 2009. Extending health insurance to 
the rural population: An impact evaluation of China's new cooperative medical scheme. 
Journal of Health Economics 28(1): 1-19. 
United Nations. 2012. Health in the post-2015 UN development agenda. Department of 
Economics and Social Affairs. 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/thinkpieces/8_health.pdf 
[28 January 2013] 
World Health Organisation: Universal Health Coverage. 
http://www.who.int/healthsystems/universal_health_coverage/en/  [28 January 2013]
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
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Variables Observations 
(number) 
Total Oportunidades 
Participants 
n=31061 
Non-participants 
n=16781 
Seguro Popular  47842 0.34 
(0.47) 
0.43 
(0.49) 
0.17 
(0.37) 
Head of household age 47842 40.99 
(10.51) 
42.62 
(9.53) 
37.96 
(11.50) 
Head of household literate 47842 0.73 
(0.44) 
0.75 
(0.43) 
0.70 
(0.46) 
Ethnic minority 47842 0.25 
(0.43) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.19 
(0.39) 
Married/cohabiting 47833 0.93 
(0.26) 
0.93 
(0.25) 
0.91 
(0.28) 
Own house 47842 0.50 
(0.50) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
Own car 47842 0.11 
(0.32) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
Deprived 47842 0.84 
(0.37) 
0.86 
(0.35) 
0.81 
(0.40) 
Household poverty index 
 
47749 
 
0.81 
(0.39) 
0.85 
(0.36) 
[30998] 
0.75 
(0.43) 
[16751] 
Weekly tobacco expenditure 32020 1.81 
(12.08) 
1.51 
(10.17) 
[19659] 
2.29 
(14.59) 
[12361] 
Monthly medical expenditure 31034 54.40 
(145.43) 
49.27 
(138.12) 
[19157] 
62.68 
(156.16) 
[11877] 
Days ill during past month 45893 1.00 
(3.51) 
0.99 
(3.49) 
[29801] 
1.01 
(3.54) 
[16092] 
Previous utilisation of health care 47613 0.29 
(0.45) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
[30921] 
0.11 
(0.31) 
[16692] 
Notes: Figures in brackets are the number of observations. Standard deviations are in 
parentheses. Monthly medical expenditure and weekly tobacco expenditure are measured in 
Mexican pesos. In 2007, the average exchange rate between Mexican pesos and US dollars 
was 0.09 US dollars to 1 Mexican peso (see http://www.x-
rates.com/average/?from=MXN&to=USD&amount=1&year=2007). Age is measured in 
years, days ill in the past month is measured in days, and all other variables are measured in 
percentages. The variable Deprived is constructed using a methodology proposed by 
CONEVAL (2009). A household is considered deprived if it has a dirt floor, the 
overcrowding index calculated as the number of individuals living in the household adjusted 
by the number of rooms exceeds 2.5, there is no piped water available in the property, or/and 
no gas/electric oven/kitchenette. The household poverty index is provided in the dataset and 
has been calculated to determine Oportunidades elegibility (INSP, 2006). Previous utilisation 
of health care denotes self-reported utilisation of preventive health care services during the 
last year.
Table 2: Marginal Effects from Logit Model for Oportunidades Participation 
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Seguro Popular insurance 
 
 
AME 
Oportunidades participant vs. 
non- participant 
0.25*** 
(0.01) 
 
Head of household age 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Head of household age squared 
 
-0.00  
(0.00) 
 
Head of household literate vs. 
illiterate 
 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
 
Ethnic minority vs. majority 
ethnic group 
 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
 
Own house vs. rent 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
 
Own car vs. no car 
 
 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
 
Deprived vs. not deprived 
 
 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
 
Weekly tobacco expenditure 
 
 
-0.00** 
(0.00) 
 
Monthly medical expenditure 
 
 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
 
Days ill during past month 
 
 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
 
Previous utilisation of healthcare 
 
 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
 
n 
 
29595 
 
Log-likelihood 
 
-16779.08 
Notes: Average marginal effects are shown. Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The model also includes state dummies which are not shown.  
  
Appendix A: Public Insurance Schemes in Mexico  
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Insurance type Participation criteria a/ 
A. Limited coverage  
IMSS-Oportunidades Compulsory to Oportunidades participants. 
Limited coverage to specific primary and 
secondary services required to meet CCT 
programme criteria to receive cash payments.  
For full coverage, beneficiaries should 
simultaneously participate in any other insurance 
programme such as Seguro Popular. 
 
B. Full coverage  
 
IMSS  
(Instituto Mexicano del Seguro 
Social) 
 
Available to workers in the formal private sector b/ 
Legally compulsory but frequently private 
employers do not enrol their employees.  
 
ISSSTE  
(Instituto de Seguridad y 
Servicios 
Sociales de los Trabajadores del 
Estado) 
 
Available to workers in the public sector 
Compulsory 
 
 
PEMEX (Petróleos Mexicanos), 
SEDENA (Secretaria de Defensa 
Nacional), 
SEMAR (Secretaria de Marina) 
 
Available to workers of each of these public 
enterprises 
Compulsory 
 
Seguro Popular 
 
Available to workers in the informal sector.  
Households eligible for alternative higher-quality 
public schemes for formal workers are not legally 
entitled to participate (Sosa-Rubí et al., 2009) 
Opt-in 
 
a/ Every scheme extends to the partner or spouse of the affiliate, children under 18 or up to 25 if single and a 
student or economically dependent and living in the same household as their parent(s). It covers relatives over 
64 and every disabled member of the family (Aterido et al., 2011). 
b/ Formal sector is defined as all those types of employment which offer regular wages and hours, which carry 
with them employment rights, and on which income tax is paid. 
Source: IMSS (http://www.imss.gob.mx/estadisticas/Documents/20112012/introduccion.pdf): 
http://www.seguro-popular.salud.gob.mx/ 
 
